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Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers 
Peter A. Joy  
INTRODUCTION 
The number of lawyers in the United States continues to increase, 
but low and middle-income persons still find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to afford legal assistance. National and state surveys 
reveal that more than 80 percent of the civil legal needs of the poor 
go unmet,
1
 as do a majority of the needs of middle-income persons.
2
 
Legal representation can often dramatically increase a person’s 
ability to win at trial or to negotiate a favorable outcome,
3
 and the 
lack of access to lawyers effectively closes the courthouse doors for 
millions.  
On the surface, the situation for those charged with criminal 
offenses is different. Anyone facing possible jail or prison time for a 
criminal matter is entitled to a lawyer, and the government is 
 
  
Vice Dean and Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. 
Louis. This Article is based on an address delivered by the author on March 22, 2011, on the 
occasion of his installation as the Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law. 
 1. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 16–18 (2009), available at http:// 
www.lafla.org/pdf/justice_Gap09.pdf. 
 2. The last national study of legal needs found that 61 percent of the legal needs of 
middle-income households are not being handled by the justice system. AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL 
NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS, MAJOR FINDINGS FROM THE 
COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 21 (1994), available at http://siteresources.worldbank 
.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/ABALegalNeedsStudy.pdf.  
 3. There is no comprehensive research on the overall effects of having legal 
representation on outcomes, but studies of several practice areas support the claim that legal 
representation increases a party’s chances of winning at trial or negotiating a favorable 
outcome. For example, Russell Engler discusses studies of housing, family, small claims, social 
security disability appeals, unemployment, immigration, and other legal cases where having a 
lawyer increased success rates. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil 
Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 37, 46–66 (2010). 
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obligated to provide that lawyer if the accused cannot pay.
4
 But, as 
this Article analyzes, there are serious issues about the quality of such 
legal representation when courts accept as effective assistance of 
counsel legal representation that falls below any reasonable standard.
5
  
For example, courts have rejected ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims in death penalty cases where defense counsel slept through 
portions of the trial,
6
 or where counsel was under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or otherwise mentally impaired during trial.
7
 This 
indifference is further represented by a criminal justice system that 
continued to appoint a lawyer to defend indigent clients even though 
the bar had reprimanded him sixteen times,
8
 and the lawyer would 
not even interview clients in jail or return client phone calls.
9
  
In upholding a death sentence, a federal judge commented on the 
Catch-22 that many poor defendants face because of the very low 
legal standard for effective assistance of counsel. The Judge stated 
that he believed “a sufficient showing ha[d] been made that trial 
counsel did not provide this accused with the quality of defense 
essential to adequate representation in any serious felony case” but 
 
 4. See infra notes 26, 39–46 and accompanying text. 
 5. In this Article, I build upon some ideas appearing in a previous article. See Peter A. 
Joy, Ensuring the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of Excessive Caseloads, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 771 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Ex Parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 751–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en 
banc) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim that included defense counsel sleeping); 
David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694–95 
(1996) (describing the case and execution of Carl Johnson whose defense counsel slept during 
trial and whose “ineptitude . . . jumps off the printed page” of the trial transcript).  
 7. See, e.g., Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding drug use by 
defense counsel irrelevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 
F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding no evidence of ineffective assistance although defense 
counsel admitted to being an alcoholic and having blackouts during trial); People v. Garrison, 
765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (holding that defendant failed to prove ineffective 
assistance of counsel although defense counsel was an alcoholic and consumed large quantities 
of alcohol each day of the trial); see generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and 
Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland 
Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1996) (describing how courts reject ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims when lawyers use drugs, alcohol, or are otherwise mentally 
impaired during trial). 
 8. All Things Considered: Not Enough Money or Time to Defend Detroit’s Poor, (NPR 
radio broadcast Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php 
?storyId=111811319. 
 9. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/9
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then proceeded to explain why he would nevertheless uphold the 
death sentence: 
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require 
that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able 
or effective counsel. . . . Consequently, accused persons who 
are represented by “not-legally-ineffective” lawyers may be 
condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by 
effective counsel, would receive at least the clemency of a life 
sentence.
10
 
As Stephen Bright has argued, caring about the quality of justice 
system we have for indigent criminal defendants is not about being 
soft or tough on crime. It is about equal justice under the law.
11
 It is 
an issue that everyone, especially members of the legal profession, 
should care about. It is about whether we have a justice system that 
inspires confidence in its decisions of guilt or innocence. It is about 
whether we can have a criminal justice system where a public 
defender, who is subject to the same ethics rules as every other 
licensed lawyer, has the ability to say “I can’t take on another case 
and represent my clients ethically,” and the courts will actually listen.  
In recent years, the media has emphasized how the criminal 
justice system at the state level is in crisis because of the enormous 
caseloads burdening many state public defenders.
12
 This crisis occurs 
because there is not enough funding to support the amount of lawyers 
needed to serve the number of clients. Due to excessive caseloads, 
our society rations justice by rationing lawyers in almost every state. 
 
 10. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring). Judge 
Rubin points out that the constitutional standard of effective assistance of counsel is so low that 
courts may not reverse even when a judge finds the representation to be less than effective as a 
practical matter, but cannot say so as a matter of law.  
 11. Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much 
Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 710 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Defenders Reject New Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A1 (reporting that public defender offices in at least seven states were 
refusing new cases or engaging in litigation over excessive caseloads); Janice Gregorson, 
Public Defenders File Grievance Over Workload, POST-BULLETIN (Rochester, Minnestoa), 
Apr. 14, 2010 (stating that fourteen public defenders in Minnesota grieved excessive caseloads 
and some refused new cases); Scott Michels, Facing Budget ‘Crisis,’ Public Defenders May 
Refuse Cases, ABC NEWS, June 13, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5049461& 
page=1 (reporting on public defender offices nationwide with excessive caseloads).  
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More than forty years ago, the National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals set the following caseload 
guidelines for full-time public defenders: a maximum of 150 felonies, 
or 400 misdemeanors, or 200 juvenile cases, or 200 mental health 
matters, or 25 appeals per year.
13
 But hearings and studies reveal that 
these caseload limits are exceeded in almost every jurisdiction in the 
United States.
14
 Data collected by the Department of Justice’s Bureau 
of Justice Statistics demonstrate that 70 percent of county-based 
public defender offices exceed these caseload guidelines,
15
 and 
fifteen of nineteen reporting state public defender programs exceeded 
the maximum caseload guidelines.
16
  
Some of the most excessive caseloads were imposed on six 
attorneys in Tennessee who handled over 10,000 misdemeanor cases 
in 2006, and public defenders in Dade County, Florida, who averaged 
 
 13. The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 
Standards for the Defense, Standard 13.12: Workload of Public Defenders, NLADA, available 
at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Standards_For_The_Defense#thirteen 
twelve. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) adopted these guidelines 
in 1984. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING AND 
AWARDING GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES, Guideline III-6 
(1984), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Negotiating_And_ 
Awarding_ID_Contracts#threesix.  
 14. In 2003, testimony at ABA hearings demonstrated that public defender caseloads in 
many states exceeded maximum caseload limits at times by more than 150 percent. AM. BAR 
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN 
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 17–18 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_
sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf. Since 2003, the 
already excessive caseloads have increased. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE 67–70 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www 
.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]. In Tennessee, six attorneys 
handled over 10,000 misdemeanor cases in 2006, and the average caseload for public defenders 
in Dade County, Florida was nearly 500 felonies and 2,225 misdemeanors per lawyer in 2008. 
Id. at 68. 
 15. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 
2007, 1, 8–10 (Georgette Walsh & Jill Duncan eds., Sept. 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj 
.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf. 
 16. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, 1, 12–14 
(Georgette Walsh & Jill Duncan eds., Sept. 2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/9
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nearly 500 felonies and 2,225 misdemeanors per lawyer in 2008.
17
 
No wonder public defense of the accused is sometimes referred to as 
“assembly-line justice.”18 
The national problem of case overloads for state public defenders 
is present in Missouri, where 368 lawyers handled 84,616 cases in 
2010, or an average of 229 felonies, misdemeanor, and other cases 
per attorney.
19
 According to the national caseload guidelines, the 
Missouri Public Defender System is short 125 lawyers.
20
 Missouri 
ranks fifteenth in the nation in the number of prisoners incarcerated,
21
 
and forty-ninth in the nation on per capita expenditures on indigent 
defense—just $5.20 per citizen.22 The average cost-per-case in 
Missouri for representation by the State Public Defender is just 
$376.00,
23
 and state public defenders are drowning in cases. By every 
objective measure, caseloads are beyond the breaking point. 
In a speech at the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Legal Aid 
Society of New York, Judge Learned Hand coined the famous phrase 
that inspired the title for this Article: “If we are to keep our 
democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration 
justice.”24 While that statement applies to all of the legal needs for the 
poor, Judge Hand directed the warning specifically at the lack of 
lawyers for those accused of crimes in state courts.
25
 Without 
 
 17. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 14, at 68. 
 18. “The belief is pervasive among ghetto residents that the lower courts in our urban 
communities dispense ‘assembly-line’ justice; that from arrest to sentencing, the poor and 
uneducated are denied equal justice with the affluent. . . .” NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS, THE 1968 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS 337 (1968).  
 19. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEFENDER COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, 
ASSURING THE PUBLIC DEFENSE 1 (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.publicdefender 
.mo.gov/about/FY2010AnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter MPD 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 20. Id. at 1. 
 21. Heather C. West et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bulletin, Prisoners in 2009, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1, 16, (Georgette Walsh & Jill Duncan eds., Dec. 2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf. 
 22. MPD 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. “Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice,” THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, http://www.legal-aid.org/ 
en/homes/thoushaltnotrationjustice.aspx (quoting Learned Hand) (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 25. Irving R. Kaufman, The Second Circuit: Reputation for Excellence, 63 A.B.A. J. 200, 
203 (1977). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 37:205 
 
 
effective, ethical representation no one accused of a crime in this 
country has real access to justice. 
This Article focuses on the crisis in Missouri’s public defender 
system due to excessive caseloads and how the rationing of lawyers 
limits access to justice for the accused. The Article proceeds in four 
parts: Part I discusses the Sixth Amendment and its importance to the 
accused; Part II briefly analyzes why the current standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel contributes to the problem of 
excessive caseloads for state public defenders; Part III focuses on the 
ethical obligations of public defenders facing excessive caseloads; 
and Part IV outlines what needs to occur in order to improve the 
justice system for the accused. 
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AS A REVOLUTIONARY CONCEPT 
The Sixth Amendment was a revolutionary concept when the 
founders included it in the Bill of Rights.
26
 In Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America, he observed that from its founding, one of 
the unique features of American society was that the “power of 
lawyers” offered the poor the possibility of equal justice against 
powerful or affluent adversaries.
27
 What amazed de Tocqueville in 
the 1830s was the transformative role lawyers played in this 
country.
28
  
This robust role for lawyers derives from the Bill of Rights and 
especially the Sixth Amendment. Early English common law 
prohibited the accused facing charges that carried the penalty of 
death—including felonies such as robbery, murder, or treason—from 
retaining a lawyer to assist with the defense.
29
 Without counsel, 
prosecutions were swift, punishment certain, and the authority of the 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 27. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 279 (Henry Reeve trans., 
1875). 
 28. Id. at 282–84. 
 29. WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8–9 (1955); 
JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 2–3 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/9
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state unquestioned.
30
 The accused could hire counsel only if facing 
misdemeanors such as libel or battery, for which the penalties were 
incarceration or loss of property.
31
  
When the framers of the U.S. Constitution inserted the Sixth 
Amendment into the Bill of Rights, the right to counsel in England 
was still limited to misdemeanors and, because of the Treason Act of 
1695, treason cases.
32
 In practice, English judges often permitted 
retained counsel to play some limited role in felony cases.
33
  
For the first 150 years of our nation, the courts interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment as a right confined to federal cases, and guaranteed 
only that the accused could retain counsel.
34
 This meant that the poor 
were on their own, and consequently there was little justice for them 
in criminal proceedings.  
The right to counsel, as we understand it today, began to expand 
in the early 1930s when the Supreme Court decided Powell v. 
Alabama,
35
 the famous Scottsboro Boys case, which guaranteed the 
right to government-provided counsel in capital cases in state 
courts.
36
 Not long after establishing the right to counsel in state 
capital cases, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst
37
 extended the right to 
appointed counsel for all federal crimes where incarceration was a 
possible punishment. It reasoned that assistance of counsel is “an 
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to 
deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”38 
Twelve years after Judge Hand’s speech, a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright.
39
 Here, the Court 
recognized for the first time that the accused facing felony charges in 
 
 30. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 3–4. Some commentators have also argued that the 
common law practice to deny counsel to the accused was in part justified by the more active 
role that judges played in trials of that era. Id. at 5. 
 31. BEANEY, supra note 29, at 8–9; TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 3. 
 32. BEANEY, supra note 29, at 9; TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
 33. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 8–9. 
 34. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 29, at 20–21. 
 35. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 36. Id. at 71. For an excellent history of the Scottsboro case, see Stephan Landsman, 
History's Stories, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1739 (1995). 
 37. 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938). 
 38. Id. at 467. 
 39. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 37:205 
 
 
state court had the right to counsel if the accused could not afford to 
hire a lawyer.
40
 Twenty-three states supported Clarence Gideon in his 
quest for legal representation, recognizing that if the criminal justice 
system is to be fair, then lawyers must assist poor people.
41
 Missouri 
was one of the supporting states, and Thomas Eagleton, then 
Attorney General of Missouri and the state’s top lawyer and 
prosecutor, signed the amicus brief.
42
  
After Gideon, the accused’s right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment expanded. A series of Supreme Court decisions found 
that the right to counsel for the poor also applied when one faced 
possible deprivation of liberty through a jail or prison sentence in 
misdemeanor cases,
43
 juvenile matters,
44
 other cases involving 
possible incarceration (such as probation revocation hearings),
45
 and 
in the first state appeal as a matter of right.
46
  
While the right to counsel attaches when there is possible loss of 
liberty in criminal cases, the right to counsel does not attach to 
criminal cases where the penalty is a fine.
47
 More recently, the 
Supreme Court in 2011 held that the right to counsel does not apply 
to incarceration for non-criminal matters such as civil contempt for 
nonpayment of child support.
48
 
Thanks to Gideon and the cases that followed, public defenders or 
court-appointed private attorneys represent those unable to afford a 
privately retained lawyer, a situation present in approximately 80 
percent of criminal cases.
49
 While Gideon established that an indigent 
 
 40. Id. at 343–44. 
 41. Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gideon v. 
Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962) (No. 155), cert. granted sub nom Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/GideonAnniversary/pleadings/$ 
FILE/State_Govt_Amicus.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972). 
 44. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1967). 
 45. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002). 
 46. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1963). Douglas was a companion case 
to Gideon decided on the same day, March 18, 1963. Id. at 353; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335. 
 47. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). 
 48. Turner v. Rogers, 79 U.S.L.W. 4553 (U.S. June 20, 2011). 
 49. A comprehensive study of indigent defense systems found that public defenders and 
appointed counsel represent 82 percent of the more than 4.2 million state felony cases in the one 
hundred most populous counties in the United States. See Carol J. DeFrances & Marika F. X. 
Litras, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bulletin, Indigent Defense Services in Large Counties, 1999, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/9
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person has the right to appointed counsel, the key issue today is the 
quality of representation that appointed counsel provides to the poor. 
II. WHY THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL STANDARD 
DOES NOT PROTECT AGAINST BAD LAWYERING 
When Gideon was decided, the standard for ineffective assistance 
of counsel in federal courts was very limited. Courts required that 
“the circumstances surrounding the trial shocked the conscience of 
the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of 
justice.”50 This “farce and mockery” standard began to change in the 
1970s. First, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that “the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”51 Circuits 
adopted this language, and the idea of effective assistance of counsel 
took hold.
52
 In 1973, ten years after Gideon, Judge Bazelon wrote for 
a panel of the D.C. Circuit and held in United States v. DeCoster
53
 
that “a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of 
an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.”54 By 1983, 
all of the circuits had adopted this new standard.
55
 
DeCoster provided a roadmap both for measuring whether 
counsel was competent and for how to allocate the burden of proof.
56
 
First, the decision stated that courts should compare defense 
counsel’s actions to the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards 
for the Defense Function in order to determine if counsel acted 
 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1 (Ellen Goldberg & Rhonda Keith eds., Nov. 2000), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf. There are approximately 3,100 
counties and independent cities in the United States, and the one hundred most populous 
accounted for 42 percent of the population in 1999. Id. at 2. 
 50. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945); see also Trapnell v. United 
States, 725 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing to cases from all circuits adopting the “farce 
and mockery” standard). 
 51. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 52. See, e.g., Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (holding 
that the defendant was entitled to “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably 
effective assistance.”). 
 53. 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 54. Id. at 1202. 
 55. The Second Circuit was the last federal circuit to replace the “farce and mockery” 
standard with the “reasonably competent assistance” of counsel standard. Trapnell, 725 F.2d at 
155. 
 56. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1202–04. 
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competently.
57
 If the court finds a substantial violation of any of the 
Standards, then the burden shifts to the government to show lack of 
prejudice to the defendant.
58
  
Shifting the burden of proof to the government is critical to a 
meaningful effective assistance of counsel standard. Judge Bazelon 
reasoned that the burden of proof had to be shifted to the government 
to prove lack of prejudice once substandard representation took place 
for two reasons. First, the government must prove guilt, and requiring 
a defendant to prove prejudice after proving counsel was not 
competent is tantamount to requiring the defendant to prove 
innocence.
59
 Second, “proof of prejudice may well be absent from the 
record precisely because counsel has been ineffective.”60 Judge 
Bazelon noted that many failures to act, such as failures to investigate 
the case or interview or call witnesses, are absent from the record 
when counsel renders inadequate assistance.
61
 
In Strickland v. Washington,
62
 the Supreme Court reversed this 
burden shifting approach and held that ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims require the defendant to prove both objectively 
unreasonable performance by the lawyer and prejudice. The Court 
defined prejudice as a reasonable probability that the lawyer’s 
inadequate performance adversely affected the outcome of the case.
63
 
As Judge Bazelon pointed out, requiring the defendant to prove 
prejudice after demonstrating unreasonable performance by the 
defense lawyer is a very difficult, and at times, an impossible 
 
 57. Id. at 1203. The ABA issued the Criminal Justice Standards in 1968. AM. BAR ASS’N, 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (3d ed. 2006) (1968), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
crimjust/standards/home.html [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS]. Chief Justice 
Warren Burger described them as “the single most comprehensive and probably the most 
monumental undertaking in the field of criminal justice ever attempted by the American legal 
profession in our national history.” Id. More than 120 United States Supreme Court opinions 
and approximately 700 federal circuit court opinions have cited to Standards. Martin Marcus, 
The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 
10, 11 (2009).  
 58. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1204. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. 466 U.S. 668 (1983).   
 63. Id. at 687–88, 694. 
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burden.
64
 In his dissent in Strickland, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
echoed Judge Bazelon’s concerns, noting that “it may be impossible 
for a reviewing court to confidently ascertain how the government’s 
evidence and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and 
cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer” and that 
“evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record 
precisely because of the incompetence of defense counsel.”65 
In a lecture, Judge Bazelon explained that judges are reluctant to 
reverse convictions on grounds of inadequate assistance of counsel 
because of the widely held belief “that most criminal defendants are 
guilty anyway,” what he termed the “‘guilty anyway’ syndrome.”66 In 
recent years, many DNA exonerations demonstrate that one cost of 
ignoring inadequate representation is the conviction of innocent 
persons whose lives are ruined because they did not have competent 
legal assistance.
67
 As former Attorney General Janet Reno observed, 
“[i]n the end, a good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful 
conviction[s].”68  
The “guilty anyway” syndrome may have laid the foundation for 
Strickland, and because of Strickland only the most outrageous 
conduct by defense counsel warrants a new trial. For example, a 
lawyer has to be so inept so as to admit a client’s guilt without the 
 
 64. See Decoster, 487 F.2d at 1204. While placing an extremely difficult burden on the 
defendant, requiring a showing of prejudice reflects a realist view that lawyers cannot perform 
perfectly in every trial. Requiring the defendant to show that the outcome was likely affected by 
defense counsel’s performance saves the government time and money on a second trial that 
appears likely to arrive at the same result. The prejudice requirement is also consistent with the 
justice system’s interest in finality of judgments, which one finds in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The “harmless error” standard provides 
that erroneous rulings admitting or excluding evidence will not trigger reversal unless there is a 
showing that “a substantial right of the party is affected.” FED. R. EVID. 103(a). The Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure state that any error “that does not affect substantial rights must be 
disregarded.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).  
 65. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 66. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1973).  
 67. A study of the first sixty-two DNA evidence exonerations showed that bad lawyering 
was the cause or contributing cause of a wrongful conviction in seventeen of the cases. BARRY 
SHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT 
RIGHT app. at 263 (2000). 
 68. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NAT’L SYMPOSIUM ON 
INDIGENT DEFENSE 2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE vii (2000). 
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client’s consent and the court has to conclude that there was no 
tactical reason to admit guilt.
69
 In other words, the defense lawyer has 
to be even more outrageous than one who sleeps, is under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, or is otherwise mentally impaired 
during trial representation.
70
  
The Strickland standard and the “guilty anyway” syndrome 
combine to produce a criminal justice system that accepts excessive 
caseloads resulting in poor lawyering. When judges, prosecutors, and 
even some defense lawyers accept excessive caseloads as a normal 
part of the criminal justice system, they essentially pretend that 
indigent defendants receive the same constitutional protections as 
defendants who are able to retain effective private counsel or 
defendants fortunate enough to be assigned to public defenders with 
manageable caseloads.  
III. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS FACING 
EXCESSIVE CASELOADS 
The first ethics rule in all but one state requires competent 
representation.
71
 The ethical requirement of competence means not 
just being qualified and experienced to handle a case but also having 
enough time to devote to the case. The rules state that a lawyer 
“should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be 
performed competently, promptly . . . and to completion.”72 And, a 
“lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be 
 
 69. People v. Diggs, 223 Cal. Rptr. 361, 368–69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 70. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 71. “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation necessary for 
the representation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2006) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES]. The duty of competence includes “adequate preparation.” Id. at R. 1.1, cmt. 5. 
California is the only state that has not modeled its lawyer ethics rules after the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. See Am. Bar Ass’n Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, About the 
Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publica 
tions/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The California 
Rules of Professional Conduct state, “[a] member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or 
repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.” CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3-110(A) (2011). 
 72. MODEL RULES, supra note 71, at R. 1.16 cmt. 1. 
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handled competently.”73 When the lawyer has so many client cases 
that her “representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” a conflict 
of interest exists.
74
 Unlike a private lawyer or law firm that has 
control over the number of client cases they accept, the individual 
public defender and the public defender system may have little 
control over their client caseload. 
This lack of control creates an ethical dilemma for the public 
defender because having too many cases is not an excuse for 
violating ethical obligations.
75
 An Arizona ethics opinion explained: 
“[t]here can be no question that taking on more work than an attorney 
can handle adequately is a violation of a lawyer’s ethical 
 
 73. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 2. Another comment to Rule 1.3 provides that a “lawyer must also 
act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy 
upon the client’s behalf.” Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 74. Id. at R. 1.7(a)(2). See, e.g., In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by Tenth 
Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (“When 
excessive caseload forces the public defender to choose between the rights of the various 
indigent criminal defendants he represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created.”). 
 75. A contract lawyer with a public defender office who had over 250 active cases was 
suspended from practice for inattention to his clients. In re Martinez, 717 P.2d 1121, 1122 
(N.M. 1986). The New Mexico Supreme Court stated: 
As licensed professionals, attorneys are expected to develop procedures which are 
adequate to assure that they will handle their cases in a proficient fashion and that they 
will not accept more cases than they can manage effectively. When an attorney fails to 
do this, he or she may be disciplined even where there is no showing of malicious 
intent or dishonesty. The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney 
but to insure [sic] that members of the public can safely assume that the attorney to 
whom they entrust their cases is worthy of that trust. 
Id. at 1122; see also Nebraska ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Holscher, 230 N.W.2d 75, 80 
(Neb. 1975) (being “extremely busy with criminal prosecutions” does not excuse a failure to 
know and follow the law).  
 Unlike public defenders, legal service lawyers are able to control their caseloads to ethical 
practice levels by refusing to accept new cases and clients. The ABA Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility approved of this approach reasoning that a “lawyer’s 
obligations to provide competent and diligent representation under Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3 
imposes a duty to monitor workload, a duty that requires declining new clients if taking them 
on would create a ‘concomitant greater overload of work.’” ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399 (1996); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981). 
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obligations.”76 Nor is it an excuse that other public defenders in the 
same jurisdiction have excessive caseloads.
77
  
A lawyer may be disciplined for the failure to research the law, 
perform an investigation, advise a client on possible defenses, or to 
take other necessary steps to provide competent representation.
78
 
Waiving a client’s right to a speedy trial as a way to balance the 
demands of too many cases is an option, but only if the waiver is 
“supported by the express or implied consent of the client himself.”79  
Some state courts and bar ethics authorities have recognized that 
the only ethical solution to excessive caseloads is for public 
defenders to decline cases. One of the first cases is State v. Peart,
80
 in 
which the Louisiana Supreme Court found that due to “excessive 
caseloads and insufficient support,” indigent clients of a public 
defender in New Orleans were “generally not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel. . . .”81 Given the excessive caseloads, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a rebuttable presumption that the 
indigent defendants in New Orleans were receiving constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel.
82
 The rebuttable presumption placed 
the burden on the state to prove that defense counsel was effective 
before the trial judge could permit a case awaiting trial to proceed. 
Shortly after the ruling, the Louisiana legislature increased indigent 
defense spending in order to remove the presumption of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.
83
 
State bar ethics opinions that have addressed this issue take the 
position that when excessive caseloads interfere with the ability to 
provide competent representation, the public defender should decline 
 
 76. Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 90-10 (1990). 
 77. At least one court has found that the customary unethical practice among other 
lawyers is not an excuse to violate the ethics rules. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Hammond, 619 S.W.2d 
696, 699 (Ky. 1981). 
 78. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Morales, 366 So.2d 431, 432–33 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) 
(disbarring defense lawyer for negligent and incompetent representation of a client); In re 
Lewis, 445 N.E.2d 987, 989–90 (Ind. 1983) (disbarring lawyer for, among other reasons, 
inadequate preparation in the representation of two defendants); Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Henry, 664 S.W.2d 62, 64–65 (Tenn. 1983) (suspending lawyer for mishandling cases). 
 79. People v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 738, 744 (Cal. 1980). 
 80. 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993). 
 81. Id. at 790. 
 82. Id. at 791. 
 83. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 14, at 120 n.79. 
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additional cases.
84
 These opinions are consistent with other cases and 
ethics opinions that emphasize that a lawyer must not take on more 
cases than can be handled competently.
85
 
The endemic problem of excessive caseloads for state public 
defenders prompted the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility to issue an ethics opinion on the 
subject.
86
 Consistent with the state court and state ethics opinions, the 
ABA opinion concluded that, “[i]f a lawyer believes that her 
workload is such that she is unable to meet the basic ethical 
obligations required of her in the representation of a client, she must 
not continue the representation of that client or, if representation has 
not yet begun, she must decline the representation.”87 To ensure that 
all defenders maintain manageable caseloads, the ABA opinion also 
discusses what a public defender should do after receiving excessive 
appointments through a public defender office,
88
 and the ethical 
 
 84. See, e.g., Wis. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. E-84-11 (1984) (stating that a public 
defender should decline new matters when the caseload interferes with the competent 
representation of clients), aff’d, Wis. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. E-91-3 (1991); S.C. 
Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-12 (2004) (declaring that all lawyers, including public 
defenders, may not have caseloads that lead to ethics violations). 
 85. See, e.g., Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 90-10 (1990) 
(stating that a public defender office must take action to ensure the workloads of attorneys so 
that they can “competently and diligently represent the number of persons assigned”); Ariz. 
Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 01-06 (2001) (declaring that a lawyer may 
not enter into an indigent defense contract that might induce the lawyer to curtail services due 
to compensation structure); Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, Ethics Op. 03-01 (2003) 
(averring that a public defense agency is prohibited from accepting cases beyond capacity of 
agency’s lawyers to provide competent representation); Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, 
Op. 1798 (2004) (stating that lawyers, including prosecutors, may not take on more cases then 
they can handle); State v. Alvey, 524 P.2d 747, 751–53 (Kan. 1974) (per curiam) (disciplining 
lawyer for violating the ethics rules by taking on more legal work than can be handled); State v. 
Gasen, 356 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (reversing contempt against criminal defense 
lawyers who refused appointments due to inability to effectively represent defendants); Zarabia 
v. Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5, 8 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (finding excessive caseload for contract 
attorney raised colorable question concerning ability to provide ethical representation to 
clients).  
 86. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006). 
 87. Id. 
 88. The opinion states: 
When a lawyer receives appointments as a member of a public defender’s office or law 
firm, the appropriate action to be taken by the lawyer to reduce an excessive workload 
might include, with approval of the lawyer’s supervisor: 
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responsibility of a lawyer who supervises other public defenders or 
who has managerial responsibilities for a public defender’s office or 
indigent defense system.
89
  
The Missouri State Public Defender System (MSPD) is attempting 
to follow its ethical obligations. A 2009 Missouri Supreme Court 
decision, State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission v. 
Pratte,
90
 outlined the procedures to follow. In Pratte, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri stated that once a public defender office exceeds 
its maximum caseload for three consecutive months, the head public 
defender in the office is required to “notify the presiding judge and 
 
 transferring non-representational responsibilities within the office, including 
managerial responsibilities, to others; 
 refusing new cases; and 
 transferring current case(s) to another lawyer whose workload will allow for the 
transfer of the case(s). 
Id. If the supervisor in the public defender office does not provide appropriate relief, then the 
opinion advises the lawyer “to advance up the chain of command within the office until either 
relief is obtained or the lawyer has reached and requested assistance or relief from the head of 
the public defender’s office.” Id. If appropriate relief is not secured within the public defender’s 
office or system, the lawyer may appeal to the governing board of the public defender’s office, 
and, if no relief is obtained, file a motion with the trial court requesting to withdraw from the 
number of cases needed to provide “competent and diligent representation to the remaining 
clients.” Id. 
 89. The supervising and managerial lawyers within the public defender office must take 
the steps necessary to ensure that each subordinate lawyer’s workload is not excessive so that 
each lawyer is able to provide competent, ethical representation of clients. Id. Those steps 
include transferring the lawyer’s non-representational duties to others in the office and 
reallocating cases within the office to balance workloads. Id. If those steps do not provide 
appropriate relief, the supervising and managerial lawyers should support a lawyer’s effort to 
withdraw from representation and, if the court will not permit withdrawal, provide whatever 
resources are necessary to assist the lawyer in client representation. Id. 
 90. 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009). In Pratte, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered 
three writ of prohibition proceedings brought by the Missouri Public Defender Commission 
seeking to refuse appointments from trial judges in certain categories of cases as contrary to a 
Commission rule adopted to control its caseload. Id. at 870, 881–85. The rule required public 
defenders to decline cases where an indigent defendant had at some point retained private 
counsel or allowed them to decline probation violation cases when an office had exceeded its 
maximum allowable caseloads. Id. at 881, 884. The Supreme Court of Missouri denied the two 
writs reasoning that “the rule cannot authorize the public defender to decline categories of cases 
that the statute requires the public defender to represent.” Id. at 884. The court made permanent 
a third writ involving a judge who sought to appoint a public defender “in his private capacity” 
in a probation violation case, reasoning that under state law a public defender does not have a 
“private capacity” as a lawyer and the judge could not require the public defender to take the 
case on that basis. Id. at 885–86. 
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prosecutors” and attempt to “agree on measures to reduce the demand 
for public defender services.”91 Measures include prosecutors 
agreeing to limit the cases in which the state seeks incarceration, 
judges identifying cases or categories of cases in which private 
attorneys will be appointed, or judges determining cases for 
dismissal.
92
 The Missouri Supreme Court stated that if there is no 
agreement with the prosecutors and the judge, then the remaining 
remedy was for “the public defender to make the office unavailable 
for any appointments until the caseload falls below the commission’s 
standard.”93 
In 2010, all MSPD attempts to reach agreements with prosecutors 
and judges were unsuccessful in some jurisdictions.
94
 When some 
offices got to the point of refusing to take more cases, a new round of 
litigation ensued.
95
 The Missouri Supreme Court appointed a Special 
Master, retired Judge Miles Sweeney, who investigated the matter 
and determined that there is “not enough time in the day to properly 
represent all the defendants assigned, but the defender must 
adequately defend clients because there is no immunity from the 
profession’s ethical requirements nor from civil liability for legal 
malpractice.”96 He concluded that in refusing new cases the MSPD 
followed the procedures outlined by the Missouri Supreme Court, but 
he stated that the procedures outlined in Pratte simply would not 
resolve Missouri’s increasing caseload and limited resources issues.97 
He noted that the procedures “cannot compel” judges to expedite case 
 
 91. Id. at 886–87. 
 92. Id. at 887. 
 93. Id. 
 94. In 2010, public defender offices across the state started certifying that they were 
exceeding their maximum caseloads. Eva Dou, Public Defenders Prepare to Turn Away Cases, 
Citing Work Overload, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, Oct. 1, 2010; Angela Riley, St. Louis County 
Public Defender’s Office Exceeded Caseload Maximum, MO. LAW. WKLY., May 12, 2010.  
 95. Maria Altman, Public Defender Case Goes to Mo. Supreme Court, KRCU NEWS, June 
22, 2011, http://krcu-news.blogspot.com/2011/06/public-defender-case-goes-to-mo-supreme 
.html. 
 96. J. Miles Sweeney, Report of the Special Master, MSPD v. Hon. John Waters and Hon. 
Mark Orr, 5, available at http://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/stltoday.com/content/ 
tncms/assets/v3/editorial/c/f1/cf153220-3eda-11e0-b344-0017a4a78c22/4d64458c17795.pdf. 
Sweeney submitted the report to the Missouri Supreme Court in February 2011. Allison Retka, 
Public Defender Report Sent to Missouri Supreme Court, MO. LAW. MEDIA, Feb. 4, 2011, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7992/is_20110204/ai_n56850115/. 
 97. Sweeney, supra note 96, at 3–4. 
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management or to appoint private counsel or require prosecutors “to 
file fewer cases, ask for less jail time, or initiate diversion 
programs.
98
  
Special Master Sweeney stated that alternatives exist, including 
volunteer attorney programs or contract attorneys, but cautioned that 
these were not long-term, viable solutions, particularly in rural 
communities that do not have a large number of attorneys to fill in 
when the public defender staff is overloaded.
99
 He opined that short 
of devoting more resources to public defenders, or compelling judges 
and prosecutors to implement measures to reduce cases for which 
public defenders are needed, reforming the Missouri Criminal Code 
to equalize penalties for similar crimes could reduce caseloads.
100
 
IV. STRATEGIES FOR KEEPING CASELOADS WITHIN ETHICAL LIMITS 
So, what is to be done in Missouri? Special Master Sweeny 
suggested that the entire criminal code in the state of Missouri be 
revised. Presumably, such a revision might reduce the number of 
criminal offenses or remove the possibility of incarceration for some 
offenses, thereby reducing the number of poor people who require 
public defenders. 
In his February 2010 State of the Judiciary address to the Missouri 
General Assembly, Missouri Supreme Court Chief Justice Ray Price 
offered up two possible alternatives: “The solution to this problem is 
relatively simple: either increase the public defender’s funding or tell 
the public defender who to defend and who not to defend within the 
limits of their funding.”101 The first alternative, more funding for the 
MSPD, is an obvious solution, but this requires state legislators and 
the governor to be concerned about justice for the poor rather than 
continuing to remain indifferent. This requires them to be motivated 
to find a solution. It will likely take the Supreme Court of Missouri to 
act consistent with its Pratte decision when it revisits the public 
 
 98. Id. at 4.  
 99. Id. at 8–10.  
 100. Id. at 11. 
 101. Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice Delivers 2010 State of the Judiciary Address, 66 J. MO. 
BAR 68, 69 (Mar./Apr. 2010).  
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defender caseload issues in deciding the case pending before it.
102
 
This is possible if the Missouri Supreme Court follows the approach 
taken by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Peart. Thus, once a public 
defender demonstrates an excessive caseload, the trial judge would be 
required to shift the burden of proof to the prosecution to demonstrate 
that the defense is able to provide adequate representation of counsel 
before a matter proceeds to trial.
103
 Reallocating the burden of proof 
to the prosecution could spur the Missouri legislators to action, just as 
the Peart decision did in Louisiana. 
The second option Chief Justice Price identified was for the 
Missouri General Assembly to evaluate whether less serious crimes 
should continue to carry the penalty of incarceration.
104
 If fewer 
crimes carried the possibility of jail or prison, there would be fewer 
persons entitled to public defenders. Chief Justice Price connected 
this option to the dramatic rise in the number of nonviolent offenders 
imprisoned in Missouri. In 1994, shortly after he joined the Missouri 
Supreme Court, the number of nonviolent offenders in Missouri 
prisons was 7,461.
105
 In 2010, the number of nonviolent offenders in 
Missouri prisons was 14,204—almost double.106 The number of new 
commitments for nonviolent offenses in 1994 was 4,857, and by 2009 
it exceeded 7,220 per year, again, almost doubling.
107
  
Reducing the number of offenses for which a person may be 
incarcerated will not only help address the problem of excessive 
caseloads for public defenders, but it will also help generate savings 
for taxpayers. Each year, it costs Missouri $16,432 per person 
incarcerated. The state currently spends $233.4 million a year to 
incarcerate nonviolent offenders, and this does not count the 
investment in the ten prisons it takes to hold these individuals at $100 
million per prison.
108
 Chief Justice Price noted that the 1994 
appropriations to the Department of Corrections totaled 
$216,753,472. In 2010, Department of Corrections’ appropriations 
 
 102. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 104. Price, supra note 101, at 69. 
 105. Id. at 70. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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were $670,079,452, an amount that basically tripled in sixteen 
years.
109
 Chief Justice Price told the legislature that some offenses, 
especially those involving defendants with drug and alcohol 
problems, might be better, and more cost-effectively addressed 
through treatment options rather than by incarceration.
110
  
By October 2011, the Missouri General Assembly had not yet 
heeded Chief Justice Price’s call for either more funding for the 
MSPD or a reduction in the number of nonviolent offenses for which 
incarceration is warranted. The Missouri Supreme Court, too, had yet 
to rule in the MSPD case seeking the ability to refuse new cases 
when caseloads are excessive. In an amicus brief supporting the 
MSPD, the ABA emphasized that the number of cases each public 
defender has must not prohibit the public defender from fulfilling the 
ethical obligations owed to each client.
111
 Until either the lawmakers 
or the courts act, access to justice for the poor in Missouri will 
continue to be limited. The final chapter has yet to be written in the 
effort of Missouri’s public defenders to provide effective, ethical 
representation to each client.  
CONCLUSION 
Justice Hugo Black stated in the Gideon decision that “lawyers in 
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”112 Nearly fifty years 
after Gideon, many indigent defendants are finding that though they 
have lawyers, it is still a luxury to have a lawyer with the ability, 
time, and resources to represent them in an ethically competent 
manner.  
Guaranteeing each individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is a fundamental principle that should unite everyone in our society, 
including prosecutors and public defenders. While the adversary 
system may divide prosecutors and defenders in the courtroom, each 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Price, supra note 101, at 70. 
 111. Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Relators at 14, 
State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters & Orr, No. SC91150 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1305296616robinson 
hackathorn_v_watersorr.pdf. 
 112. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  
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prosecutor has an overarching duty to seek justice—including 
procedural justice for the accused.
113
 That obligation has not changed 
since Gideon, when so many states’ attorneys general joined in 
asking the Court to order states to provide counsel for those too poor 
to pay. Today, the call for equality in the criminal justice system 
requires the recognition that justice is not possible when excessive 
caseloads for public defenders deny competent, ethical representation 
to the poor.  
 
 113. MODEL RULES, supra note 71, at 3.8 cmt. 1. 
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